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1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
When collective bargaining began, it was as a mechanism used by employers and groups 
of employees to resolve their conflicting goals, however it has evolved through the years 
to become a ‘sophisticated means of transforming and regulating what occurs in the 
workplace’.
1
 It is seen as a necessary element of employment relations because it allows 
the employer to ‘give effect to its legitimate expectation that the planning of production, 
distribution, etc., should not be frustrated through interruptions of work’.
2
 It therefore 
allows certainty and stability within the workplace, a feature good for production and for 
the commercial entity overall. On the other hand, workers aim to ensure that their  
 
‘legitimate expectations…wages and other conditions of work should be such as to 
guarantee a stable and adequate form of existence and as to be compatible with the 





South Africa’s collective bargaining system emerged after the enactment of the 
1924 Industrial Conciliation Act.
4
 This Act created a framework for voluntary 
centralised bargaining. Bargaining was to be centralised and to take place between 
unions and employers at industrial councils. The system however, excluded all African 
and indentured Indian labour. It was thus a labour relations system based on race and 
which created a racial divide. The legislative framework established by the 1924 and 
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 Acts was thus designed to be repressive towards African workers. It favoured and 
protected non-African labour thereby creating and perpetuating tension within the labour 
relations system. Non-African unions were able to register as unions and thus able to 
negotiate with employers’ associations at industrial councils. This ensured that the 
wages and terms and conditions of employment of non-African workers improved, 
whilst those of African workers did not. This created inequalities within the labour 
market. There were attempts by government to remedy the situation. Unfortunately these 
attempts were conservative and unable to fully address the issue of race, consequently 
the inequalities remained.  
 
Although African workers were prohibited from forming registered unions and 
bargaining at industrial councils, this did not prevent African workers from forming and 
joining unregistered unions.
6
 Despite the repression that African workers faced from the 
successive governments in power African unions began to grow. Although they did face 
some challenges, these unions generally grew stronger between the 1940s and the 1980s. 
This was a result of the growth of the labour intensive secondary sector from the 1930s 
to the 1970s. The manufacturing sector was typically labour intensive and thus 
employed a large number of African workers. This meant that large groups of African 
workers could be found in one location thus making it easier for unions to recruit them. 
Their ability to recruit a significant number of the workforce as well as improve the 
conditions of their members was displayed by the Durban strikes in 1973. These strikes, 
which began in Durban, ultimately acted as the catalyst for change. The government had 
no choice but to make significant changes to the legislation governing industrial 
relations.
7
 The key legislative changes were made between 1979 and 1981. However, 
they were not enough to address all the issues the bargaining system had. During the late 
1970s and 1980s issues relating to the duty to bargain, bargaining levels as well as the 
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 Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. 
6
 Robert A. Jones Collective Bargaining in South Africa (1982) 28. 
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empirical and conceptual study of collective bargaining (Development Policy Research Unit Working 












future of industrial councils arose between African unions and employers. These were 
matters the new labour dispensation would have to address.  
 
The government in the new democratic South Africa prioritised resolving the 
problems plaguing the industrial relations system. It did this by enacting a new labour 
relations Act. This Act repealed the 1956 LRA and enacted the Labour Relations Act of 
1995
8
 which established a collective bargaining system combining new elements with 
elements from the previous legislative dispensation. The new system retained the 
voluntary duty to bargain. It balanced this by entrenching a protected right to resort to 
industrial action as well as by creating organisational rights available to unions with 
‘sufficient’ and/or majority representivity. The former enabled unions to compel the 
employer to bargain, whilst the latter assisted unions in bargaining. The Act also 
promoted centralised bargaining. It did this by retaining, but renaming industrial 
councils, bargaining councils and by ensuring that bargaining council agreements could 
be extended where parties to the agreement covered the majority of workers in a sector. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of trade unions depended, to a substantial extent, ‘on their 
representativeness and their cohesiveness’.
9
 The collective bargaining mechanism 
established by the 1995 LRA thus became the primary 
 
‘mechanism for setting wages and other terms of employment…a way of managing 
complex organisations…a form of joint industrial government, and generally…a means 




2. SOUTH AFRICAN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A GLOBALISED ECONOMY 
 
2.1 GLOBALISATION  
                                                 
8
 Act 66 of 1995. 
9
 Windmuller op cit note 1 at 18. 
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Globalisation is usually accompanied by, 
 
‘trade liberalisation and a rising volume of international trade; currency market 
liberalisation and an enormous increase in international currency transactions; 
liberalisation of the rules governing foreign investment and cross-border capital flows; 
the emergence and dominance of multi-national enterprises; increased manufacturing in 





Therefore, globalisation, like the industrial revolution, has influenced economies, 
politics, societies and cultures in both developed and developing countries within the last 
few decades.
12
 Although globalisation is a term that is familiar to most, its meaning is 
contested. It ‘is one of the most used, but also one of the most misused and one of the 
most confused, words around today’.
13
 Therefore, globalisation takes on different 
meanings in different contexts, however, for our purposes globalisation shall be 
examined in the context of labour.  
 
There are a different schools of thought regarding globalisation, but the two most 
prominent are the ‘hyper-globalists’ and the ‘neo-liberals’. The ‘hyper-globalists’ argue 
that globalisation has created a ‘borderless world’, a world in which ‘nation-states are no 
longer significant actors or meaningful economic units’.
14
 Globalisation is viewed as an 
‘inevitable state of affairs’
15
 where governments, regardless of their political persuasion, 
appear increasingly powerless to make decisions on economic or social policy.
16
 This 
school of thought believes that these developments have encouraged companies to cut 




 Steve Chan & James R. Scarritt (eds) Coping with globalisation: Cross-national patterns in domestic 
governance and policy performance (2002) at 4. 
13
 Peter Dicken Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy 5ed (2007) 7. 
14




 Debbie Budlender Industrial relations and collective bargaining: Trends and developments in South 












back on labour costs and shed labour for the sake of forcing the stock market value of 
their enterprise to rise.
17
 On the other hand are the ‘neo-liberals’. They argue that 
globalisation was the ‘most positive economic development in the past century.’
18
 
According to this perspective, globalisation has resulted in a ‘more efficient allocation of 
resources and exploitation of comparative advantages between countries’ consequently 
raising productivity, boosting economic growth and providing increased prosperity for 
all.
19




Globalisation is, however, more intricate than this as it is a set of 
‘complex…inter-related processes’.
21
 In addition, globalisation is neither entirely 
“good” nor entirely “bad”. The ILO states that the position lies in between these two 
opposite points. The ILO  
 
‘is generally optimistic about the net impact of free trade and increased foreign 
investment on economic growth and the level of employment. However, it 
acknowledges that as economic competition across national borders intensifies the 




There have been a number of changes taking place on a global scale. Economies 
were once ‘based in manufacturing and mining, with public works providing services, 
all oriented to fixed workplaces where workers were under a common roof’.
23
 However, 
this has changed. Globalisation has led to the ‘fragmentation of many production 
processes and their geographical relocation on a global scale in ways that slice through 
national boundaries.’
24
 The cumulative effect of this new phenomenon has been the 
introduction of a new dynamic where 
 










 Dicken op cit note13 at 29. 
22
 Budlender op cit note 16 at 2. 
23
 Guy Standing Work after globalisation: Building occupational citizenship (2009) 66. 
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‘[c]apital and labour live in different places and times. While capital is global, exists in 
the space of flows and lives in the instant time of computerised networks, labour 









Globalisation has not only altered the world economy, it has also led to the 
‘emergence of a new division of labour.’
27
 The previous economic model ‘consisted of 
an integrated enterprise, belonging to an industrial sector, employing a mass of 
employees administered by a management bureaucracy’.
28
 There was a lot vested in the 
concept of the workplace.
29
 Globalisation has led to the transformation of many aspects 
of labour.
30
 It has altered the character of the firm and the workplace.
31
 It has led to the 
‘splintering of production processes’ which has resulted in a trend towards contracting 




2.2 South Africa and globalisation 
South Africa has not escaped the effects of globalisation. Before 1994 the South African 
economy had gone through ‘a phase of progressive de-linking from global processes and 
integration in the global economy’.
33
 However, when South Africa gained democracy it 
re-entered the world economy.
34
 It did so at a time when globalisation and its processes 
had begun to gain momentum. Therefore, when South Africa re-joined the world 
economy it was exposed to the effects of globalisation. This had a profound effect on its 
economy and economic policies. 
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 Ronaldo Munck Globalisation and labour: The new “great transformation” (2002) 57. 
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 Dejo Olowu ‘Globalisation, labour rights, and the challenges for trade unionism in Africa’ (2006) 18 Sri 
Lanka Journal of International Law 132. 
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 Standing Work after globalisation op cit note 23 at 66. 
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 Christian Rogerson ‘Local economic development in an era of globalisation: The case of South African 














South Africa’s exposure to globalisation resulted in the introduction of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR) which was ‘designed to accommodate 





South Africa’s exposure to globalisation also had a profound impact on 
employment. The economy had opened up to international trade and consequently, it 
now faced greater competition than before.
36
 The primary and secondary sectors, which 
had been relatively sheltered until the early 1990s, underwent a period of decline.
37
 The 
decline experienced in these sectors had an impact on labour as these two sectors were 
the most labour intensive sectors.
38
 Formal employment in these sectors fell,
39
 however 
employment in the tertiary sector increased.
40
 This thus changed the sectoral 




The changes that resulted in the employment sector as a result of globalisation 
were not only limited to the number of people in employment. They also affected the 
nature of employment. The pressures employers were exposed to led to the 
flexibilisation of labour. This resulted in the rise of what has been termed ‘atypical’ or 
non-standard employment. Atypical employment is employment lacking the 
characteristics found in a standard employment relationship. This form of employment 
has been described as, 
 
‘part-time work, casual work, homework, subcontract work, unstable irregular 
employment, disguised wage work, family labour, moonlighting, illegal work or work in 
illegal, short-term contractual or fixed employment, work that entails combining pre-










 Abhijit Banerjee, Sebastian Galiani, Jim Levinsohn et al ‘Why has unemployment risen in the new 
South Africa?’at 19 available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13167.pdf  accessed on 17 September 2011. 
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Therefore, where the standard employment relationship may be described as indefinite, 
full-time and, in most cases, conducted at the workplace of the employer; an atypical 
employment relationship is one where the terms and conditions of employment do not 
comply with this criteria.
43
 Flexibilisation has created a new class of vulnerable and 
relatively powerless workers who are in need of more rather than less protection from 
labour laws. This will be demonstrated below.  
 
2.2.1. Casualization 
Casualization is the result of temporal flexibilisation. This arises from the employer’s 
desire to replace employees in a standard employment relationship with temporary or 
seasonal labour and/or part time employees. This changes the standard employment 
relationship by altering the employment relationship between employer and employee 
from continuous to temporary and/or from full time to part time. Although the use of 
temporary, seasonal and/or part time labour has always been around, it has become 
evident that the use of these labour arrangements is becoming more and more 
predominant.
44
 It is also important to note that in the past these workers would have 
been considered as part of the core function of the business, and thus important to the 
survival of the business. However, in the era of globalisation these workers are now 




Employers clearly benefit from the casualization process. They are able to reduce 
their labour costs by avoiding the ‘non-wage costs of employment such as paid leave, 
sick leave, healthcare compensation etc’.
46
 They are also able to link the demand for 
business to the size of their labour force. They can thus increase their workforce when 
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43
 Andries Bezuidenhout, Shane Godfrey, Jan Theron et al Non-standard employment and its policy 
implications (Report submitted to the Department of Labour June 2003) 5. 
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 Theron & Godfrey op cit note 42 at 6. 
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business picks up and they can decrease it when their business faces a downturn.
47
 
Unfortunately the consequences of casualisation are not mutually beneficial. Casualised 
workers face a number of disadvantages their permanently employed peers do not. For 
instance businesses that employ casualised workers do not have to provide employment 
benefits such as a pension schemes, medical aid, paid sick leave and maternity leave.
48
 






Externalisation occurs when ‘employment regulated by a contract of employment 
is…displaced by employment that is regulated by a commercial contract.’
50
 
Externalisation is caused by the employer’s need to achieve numerical employment 
flexibility. It may occur when an employer retrenches various sections of his workforce 
and uses contracted workers or workers from a temporary employment service (TES) to 
do the work instead. If an employer chooses to engage contractors the contract of 
employment between the employer and the employees is replaced with a commercial 
contract between the employer and an independent contractor, or between the employer 
and a self-employed individual.
51
 In this instance, the retrenched employees find 
themselves in precarious employment positions as either workers in the informal sector 
or workers for ‘small service suppliers’
52
 such as subcontractors or a TES. 
Externalisation therefore forces employees to trade relatively permanent and secure 
employment with their employers for either ‘short term highly insecure contracts’
53
 or 
unemployment. If an employer makes use of a TES a triangular employment relationship 
is created between the TES, employer and worker. The TES becomes a nominal 
employer supplying labour and assuming the risk of employment. The employer, 
however, is the real employer as it ultimately determines the terms and conditions of 



























 The triangle is completed by the commercial contract that ties the 
nominal employer (service provider) to the real employer (client).
55
 This form of 
employment is not only highly precarious, but it changes the standard employment 
relationship by obscuring who the employer is and by moving the worker’s place of 
work from the employer’s premises, to those of the client’s. 
 
2.2.3. Informalisation 
The combination of casualisation and externalisation has led to informalisation. 
Informalisation occurs when employment becomes increasingly unregulated either in 
part or altogether.
56
 Informal work in South Africa has been described as work which 
occurs at businesses that are not registered in any way. Thus, it is work which ‘takes 
place outside the formal wage-labour market…including various forms of self-
employment.’
57
 It is usually conducted from homes, street pavements, and in some cases 
business premises. During apartheid legislation repressed the development and growth 
of African businesses.
58
 This was meant to deter ‘rural-urban migration and…to protect 
white business from competition’.
59
 The effect of this was to push African enterprise and 
entrepreneurship into the informal market.
60
 Towards the end of apartheid this 
legislation was repealed which resulted in the informal sector experiencing accelerated 
growth.
61
 Therefore, although the effects of globalisation have played a significant part 
in increasing the number of employees in the informal sector, some of the growth can 
also be attributed to the removal of apartheid legislation from the South African statute 
books. In general, the informal sector tends to attract entrepreneurs because it enables 
them to conduct business outside of the rules that apply to most. For example, the 
informal sector can generally escape ‘state regulation in terms of taxation, labour 
                                                 
54




 Bezuidenhout et al op cit note 43 at 6. 
57
 Munck Globalisation and labour op cit note 25 at 112. 
58
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regulations and other general rules that are applicable in the conduct of business.’
62
 
Informalisation results in the ‘atomisation of the workforce’.
63
 This makes the de facto 
protection of workers in the informal sector extremely difficult. 
 
2.3. Globalisation and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
The Labour Relations Act of 1995
64
 was drafted to function within the standard 
employment relationship context. It based the regulation of market forces on statutory 
regulation and collective voice regulation. These two forms of regulation were intended 
to counter the inequalities of the labour market. Statutory regulation refers to the ‘rules 
and procedures established by laws and decrees that govern aspects of the employment 
relationships’.
65
 Collective voice regulation ‘refers to the constructive role that collective 
bargaining between employees and employers play in resolving disputes and thereby 
promoting productivity and economic growth’.
66
 The sections establishing the collective 
voice regulation mechanism were drafted in such a way as to make collective bargaining 
dependent on the ability of unions to recruit and retain members.
67
 The effects of 
globalisation have however, resulted in increased flexibility in the nature of 
employment. The 1995 LRA has struggled to adequately cater to the growing numbers 
of atypical workers. Atypical workers are notoriously difficult to organise and as a result 
unions have battled to gain organisational rights and compel employers to bargain. 
Furthermore, unions have found it difficult to have agreements concluded at bargaining 
councils extended as they no longer represent the majority of workers within a sector. 
Therefore, unions have battled to use the collective bargaining scheme set up in the 1995 
                                                 
62
 Ibid. 
63 Munck Globalisation and labour op cit note 25 at 113. 
64
 Act 66 of 1995. 
65
 Gordon Betcherman, Amy Luinstra & Makoto Ogawa ‘Labour market regulation: International 
experience in promoting employment and social protection’ (Social Discussion Paper Series No. 0128 
November 2001) at 4 available at 
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market-DP/0128.pdf accessed on 19 September 2011. 
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LRA to improve the wages and terms and conditions of employment for atypical 
workers.  
 
3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Statutory regulation can only cater for some and not all eventualities, consequently it is 
inherently inflexible. It therefore generally struggles to adapt to any fundamental 
changes that might occur. The 1995 LRA is no exception to this phenomenon. When the 
drafters of the 1995 LRA created the Act they were working within the context and 
paradigm of standard employment relationships. Therefore the collective bargaining 
mechanisms established by the 1995 LRA were tailored for standard employment 
relationships. The drafters of the Act underestimated the manner in which workers in 
atypical forms of employment would increase over the coming decades. At present, the 
bargaining system established by the 1995 LRA is operating in a changed context. The 
1995 LRA has battled to adapt to and accommodate the flexibility introduced to 
employment relationships by globalisation. This paper tries to establish whether other 
regulatory devices can be added to the labour market as a way of supporting the 
collective voice regulatory system established by the 1995 LRA and ensuring that it 
better caters to atypical workers. 
4.  SCHEME OF PAPER 
The paper is divided into four chapters, with each chapter focussing on a specific theme. 
The first chapter will look at the history and emergence of South Africa’s collective 
bargaining system. The second chapter will focus on the collective bargaining structure 
that was established by the 1995 Labour Relations Act.
68
 Chapter three will assess just 
how well the system that was established in 1995 is coping today in light of the changes 
that have been driven by globalisation. The final chapter will try to look at possible 
solutions before concluding.  
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South Africa’s industrial relations history has influenced and shaped its current 
collective bargaining structure. This chapter aims to describe as well as discuss the 
history of collective bargaining in South Africa. It will do this by highlighting the major 
milestones in South Africa’s collective bargaining history which have helped to shape 
the bargaining structures we have today. Examining the history which shapes our current 
legislation will help explain the direction the drafters of the Labour Relations Act of 
1995
69
 took, as well as shed some light on the challenges our collective bargaining 
system is currently facing. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
When diamonds and gold were discovered in South Africa at the end of the nineteenth 
century there was a shortage of labour.
70
 This shortage of labour attracted workers from 
all over the world. Skilled workers poured in from overseas, whilst unskilled African 
labourers, as well as Indian and Chinese labourers voluntarily entered into the country.
71
 
This created competing interests amongst the various groups of labourers. First, it placed 
a large number of workers from different races in a small locality and second, it created 
discrimination.
72
 When the skilled labourers from overseas migrated to South Africa 
they brought their skills and expertise as well as the institutions of bargaining to which 
they had grown accustomed. Therefore, upon their arrival in South Africa they formed 
craft unions. These unions brought together workers trained in a particular skill.
73
 The 
overall aim of these unions was to maintain the status of skilled workers as well as to 
guard the domain of skilled workers.
74
 The craft unions therefore excluded African 
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workers, who were regarded as cheap, unskilled labour.
75
 African workers also faced 
pressure from an influx of unskilled white labour which competed with African 
workers.
76
 This created pressure for unskilled jobs which led to unrest.
77
 Finally the 
different groups of workers were not paid the same wages. There was a gap in wages 
between the skilled white labourers and the African, Indian and Chinese labourers. This 
gap in wages was to persist and continue to be problematic over the next few decades.  
 
The pressures created by the competing interests between skilled and unskilled 
labourers in South Africa led to several strikes occurring in the mining sector from 1907 
to 1922. The unrest was caused by white workers reacting to the inclusion of African 
workers into certain occupations.
78
 They felt that the inclusion of African workers would 
reduce their wages and threaten their lifestyle.
79
 At that time, the Industrial Disputes 
Prevention Act of 1909
80
 was the only piece of legislation attempting to regulate 





The gold mining industry came under pressure when the production of gold 
decreased by twelve and a half per cent.
82
 The Chamber of Mines, which had been 
created to represent the major mines operating at the time, tried to cut production costs 
by using African labour which was cheaper than white labour.
83
 Replacing white labour 
with similarly skilled, but cheaper, African labour was contrary to the agreement the 
Chamber of Mines had signed with the S.A. Industrial Federation, which had been 
established to represent the white mineworkers.
84
 The Chamber of Mines and the S.A. 
Industrial Federation tried and failed to come to a negotiated agreement. After 
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negotiations broke down the Chamber of Mines announced that it intended to retrench 
two thousand white workers. This led to white mineworkers striking.
85
 They were joined 
by sympathetic workers, and so the mineworkers strike turned into a general strike 
which was to be later termed the Rand Rebellion.
86
 The Rand Rebellion exposed the 
inadequacy of labour regulation and bargaining structures in South Africa.
87
 It thus 
became clear that there was an ‘urgent need to create means to enable employers and 




This realisation prompted the government to address the labour unrest by 
enacting the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924,
89
 which was the first statute to regulate 
labour throughout South Africa.
90
 Its aim was to provide for the ‘prevention and 
settlement of disputes between employers and workers’.
91
 The Act created a voluntary 
collective bargaining system which was supported by the voluntary establishment of 
industrial councils between registered unions and an employers’ organisation.
92
 These 
industrial councils operated within a certain industry, occupation or undertaking and had 
jurisdiction over that industry.
93
 Bargaining took place at industrial councils, between 
unions and employers’ organisations.
94
 The Act also empowered the Minister to extend 
any of the collective agreements concluded to cover workers within a particular industry 
if the trade union and employers’ organisation were sufficiently representative.
95
 These 
collective agreements were extensive in their coverage and could regulate the following 
bargaining topics; 
 
‘remuneration, methods of calculating minimum rates of remuneration, manner of 
remuneration, piece-work rates and matters pertaining to piece-work, who may be 
employed in a particular class of work, the prohibition of the employment of persons 






 Piron op cit note 70 at 124. 
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under a certain age…establishment of pension, sickness, medical, unemployment, 




Bargaining at industry level allowed trade unions to negotiate with several 
employers within a particular industry simultaneously.
97
 This arrangement was 
beneficial for unions because it ensured that workers doing similar jobs in an industry 
worked under similar conditions, thus promoting a sense of equity.
98
 It also ensured that 
wages and working conditions were standardised.
99
 It also saved the resources of both 
unions and employers as bargaining took place in one location at the same time, thus 
doing away with the need to bargain with different unions or employers again and 
again.
100
 Therefore, although industry level bargaining was introduced by the Act it 
became a feature of the South African bargaining system because of its practicality.  
 
The collective bargaining mechanism that was established by the 1924 Act did 
not apply to every worker in South Africa. It was limited in two ways. First, it covered 
the private sector only.
101
 Therefore any civil servants or workers in the public sector 
were excluded. However, it is important to note that within the private sector certain 
industries such as the domestic service and agriculture were also excluded.
102
 Second, 
the Act excluded all pass-bearing African workers from the definition of employee, 
thereby formalising the practice of exclusion and racial discrimination which had come 
to exist.
103
 Therefore, in terms of the Act, only white, coloured and non-indentured 
workers were allowed to join and form registered trade unions.
104
 African workers could 
not form registered trade unions and thus they could not take part in bargaining at 
industrial councils.
105
 Despite being excluded from bargaining at industrial councils, 
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African workers attempted to establish their own unions.
106
 However the growth of these 
unions was unstable.
107
 Those African unions that did manage to establish themselves 
and grow were limited to bargaining with individual companies at plant level. 
Bargaining at this level was erratic as ‘employers were generally suspicious of them, and 
since they were not recognised by law, there was no compulsion to deal with them’.
108
 
The new labour legislation effectively created a racial divide within labour which was to 
become increasingly problematic with the passage of time. 
 
2.1. THE LABOUR SYSTEM BETWEEN THE 1920S AND 1960S 
South Africa’s economy had primarily been founded on agriculture and mining, 
however between the 1920s and 1930s its economic base broadened.
109
 The primary 
sector, which comprised of agriculture and mining, began to decrease, whilst the 
secondary sector, which was based on manufacturing, increased its contribution to the 
Gross Domestic Product.
110
 This period was therefore accompanied by ‘sustained and 
rapid industrialisation’.
111
 This created a demand for labour and consequently the 
secondary sector became a major employer.
112
 By 1960 12 per cent of the workforce was 
employed in manufacturing and 53 per cent of that workforce consisted of African 
labour.
113
 Therefore, the period between the late 1940s and 1960s was characterised by a 
growth in employment and an increase in the African working class. This created 
competition for jobs between African and white workers.  
 
African unions began to grow in numbers from the 1930s. Industrialisation and 
the labour shortage it had created, led to an influx of workers into factories. This meant 
that large groups of workers could be found in a central location therefore making it 
easier for African unions to recruit members. Although the number of unions increased 
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the unions themselves did not strengthen in terms of organisation and strategy.
114
 
African unions managed to organise workers, however their inability to bargaining at 
industrial councils meant that they were unable to make any significant and far reaching 
gains for workers;
115
 consequently disillusioned ‘members tended to drift away’ after 
some time.
116
 Furthermore, the legal restrictions placed on the movement of Africans 
made the administration of unions difficult.
117
 The unions therefore remained weak. 
 
Towards the end of the 1950s African trade unions began to realign 
themselves.
118
 This was prompted, amongst other things, by the decision of the South 
African Trades and Labour Council to exclude African trade unions from 
membership.
119
 This led to the formation of the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) in 1955.
120
 African unions operating at that time were under pressure to deal 
with the demands of their members regarding the political repression they faced. These 
issues were inseparably bound up with the African workforce’s economic situation.
121
 
Therefore, any African unions at that time who sought to discharge their duties and to 
achieve their aims were inevitably drawn on to the political platform.
122
 This created a 
relationship between labour and politics and ultimately created conflict between African 




The Nationalist Party, which had come into power in 1948, sought to counteract 
natural market forces by creating policies which would protect white workers at the 
expense of African workers.
124
 This ultimately led to the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 
of 1956. The Act allowed the National Party to use ‘industrial conciliation machinery’ to 
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regulate and control a section of the workforce.
125
 The Act did this by prohibiting 
African workers from joining a registered union and prohibiting workers from 
registering new unions that were ‘mixed’ or in other words, that had both coloured and 
white members.
126
 Those unions that were already in existence and had both white and 
coloured members had to set up separate branches for their members.
127
 In addition, the 
Act held that only white members could hold executive posts.
128
 The Act also introduced 
the concept of ‘job reservation’.
129
 The idea behind ‘job reservation’ was to keep certain 
types of work ‘for persons of a specified race’.
130
 Section 77 of the 1956 Act  
 
‘empowered the Minister of Labour to safeguard the economic welfare of employees of 




White labour was thus protected from competition from other racial groups whilst 
Coloured and Indian labour was protected from comp tition from African labour.
132
 This 
further entrenched the racial divide amongst workers. 
 
The National Party’s desire to bring the industrial relations regime in line with 
the government’s apartheid policy strengthened the relationship between political 
organisations and African unions. During the late 1950s and early 1960s the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 
played an important part in the growing resistance to apartheid.
133
 Although SACTU 
was a labour federation it put most of its energy into mass campaigns rather than into 
bargaining.
134
 During the 1960s SACTU’s leadership joined the ANC’s military wing, 
Umkhoto we Sizwe (MK).
135
 However, when the government arrested most of the MK’s 
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2.2. LABOUR SYSTEM BETWEEN THE 1970S AND 1980S 
At the start of the 1970s African trade unions were weak.
137
 They had managed to 
organise African workers, however they had been unable to use their ability to organise 
workers to create any meaningful change in the working conditions of the African 
workforce. SACTU had established strong political ties with the ANC which ultimately 
led to the suppression of the African trade union movement. Although African unions 
were at a low point they would soon recover, as a result of various socio-economic 
factors, and ultimately gain real change for African workers. 
 
A number of important changes occurred during the early 1970s and 1980s. In 
South Africa, the African component in the labour market expanded. The number of 
African workers employed in manufacturing and construction were now in the millions 
and although section 77,
138
 which created job reservation still existed, job reservation 
had effectively crumbled in practice and a range of occupations opened up for 
Africans.
139
. This led to more African workers in skilled and professional positions 
ultimately increasing the number of Africans in urban areas.
140
 The period of rapid 
economic growth which had been experienced on a world-wide scale since the end of 
the Second World War came to an end which placed pressure on the South African 
economy.
141
 Therefore, despite the growing African workforce, the majority of urban 
African families were extremely poor and battled to survive in an economy experiencing 
rising prices.
142
 These factors ultimately led to the outbreak of strikes by African 
workers in Durban in 1973. These strikes spread to the rest of the country. 
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The Durban strikes, coupled with the realisation that the growth of the South 
African economy in the future lay in the hands of African workers, drove the 
government to make some changes.
143
 The government amended the Native Labour 
(Settlements Disputes) Act
144
 to provide for joint liaison committees of employers and 
African workers that would operate alongside work committees.
145
 Work committees 
had been created by the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act.
146
 They were 
meant to be used by African workers as ‘an alternative to collective bargaining in 
industrial councils’.
147
 The committee system was rejected by the African workers who 
flocked to join the new, unregistered unions that had emerged in the wake of the 
strikes.
148
 These unions were excluded by statute from bargaining at industrial councils 
and thus they made the workplace their powerbase.
149
 They realised that earlier unions 
had crumbled because of their inability to improve the status of African workers by 
failing to engage in bargaining. These new unions therefore tried to avoid the same fate. 
They invested in organisation, by establishing a strong shop steward structure and in 
negotiation, by pressurising employers to engage in collective bargain at plant-level.
150
 
These new unions therefore, backed their organisation with ‘militant collective action’ 





The government appointed the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour 
Legislation in 1977 and it made its recommendations in 1979.
152
 It recommended that 
the existing definition of ‘employee’ be extended to cover African workers and that 
African workers be permitted to join and form registered trade unions.
153
 This would 
                                                 
143
 Godfrey, Maree, Du Toit et al op cit note 81 at 55. 
144
 Act 48 of 1953. 
145
 Godfrey, Maree, Du Toit et al op cit note 81 at 54. 
146
 Act 48 of 1953. 
147
 Godfrey, Maree, Du Toit et al op cit note 81 at 51. 
148






















formally include African workers into the statutory framework. It would also allow 
African workers to be represented directly at industrial councils for the first time.
154
 The 
Commission also recommended the creation of a National Manpower Commission.
155
 
The Commission would include representatives from employer’s organisations, trade 
unions and the state who would be tasked with ‘monitoring the labour situation in the 
country and elsewhere’.
156
 The Wiehahn Commission also recommended the 
establishment of an Industrial Court, tasked with adjudicating labour disputes and unfair 




The recommendations made by the Wiehahn Commission were a lot less 
cautious than its predecessors. It tackled the racial dual system which had become 
entrenched by legislation head on. Unfortunately, the National Party government was 
not as progressive as the Commission. They did not embrace the recommendations made 
by the Wiehahn Commission fully. Instead, they adopted a more cautious approach. This 
was encompassed in the 1979 amendment
158
 to the Industrial Conciliation Act.
159
 The 
amendment to the 1956 Act included African workers in the definition of employee 
however, the inclusion was limited to African workers with permanent urban residence 
rights only.
160
 The amendments did not remove the restrictions on trade unions.
161
 This 
meant that the unions with non-urban African workers and mixed unions still could not 
participate fully in the bargaining system.
162
 However, the government would soon 
incorporate all African workers in the next few years. The government did, however 
follow the Commission’s recommendations and set up a National Manpower 




2.3. THE TRANSITION PHASE 










 It was during this period that the Act was renamed the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
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In 1979 the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) was created.
164
 It was 
multi-racial although it developed from ‘solid black-union roots’ and it strove for 
industrial, instead of craft unions.
165
 The African unions were unhappy with the 
restrictions that still existed and thus they pushed for greater change.
166
 The government, 
in 1981 amended the statue books again.
167
 This time it expanded the definition of 
employee to include all African workers and it also removed all racial restrictions on 




Initially the unregistered unions did not trust the new dispensation, thus they 
resisted registering with the Department of Labour.
169
 The government overcame this 
resistance by extending the regulations placed on registered unions to unregistered 
unions. This meant that unregistered African unions faced the same restrictions as 
registered unions, without the benefit of bargaining at industrial councils. The extension 
of the regulations therefore effectively coerced African unions into registering.
170
 
African unions were now faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, their organisational 
power base was at the workplace and they had become accustomed to bargaining at the 
workplace. On the other hand, they were now able to bargain at industrial councils, 




Unions began to form more federations in the early 1980s. The Council of 
Unions of South Africa (CUSA) and the South African Allied Workers Union 
(SAAWU) were formed during this period. The formation of these federations signified 
the ‘burgeoning growth and strength of the new unions’ and thus their ability to ‘hold 
their own’ at industrial councils.
172
 This meant that the initial position unions had taken 
on whether or not to bargain at industrial councils needed to be reappraised.
173
 FOSATU 
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was able to develop a new policy concerning which level to bargain for its affiliates, 
however CUSA and SAAWU were too busy consolidating their structures to create a 
solution for their affiliates. FOSATU resolved that its affiliates could join councils as 
long as they benefitted from the bargaining and they did not abandon their plant level 
bargaining.
174
 The appropriate level of bargaining and the relationship between plant and 




A few years later the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was 
formed in 1985.
176
 COSATU focused on industrial level bargaining. From the start it 
pushed for the establishment of one union operating in one industry, which would 
eventually lead to ‘national, industry-wide councils in all sectors’.
177
 This shift in policy 
reflected a growth in confidence from the unions. 
 
The close ties between labour federations and political organisations which had 
emerged during the 1970s continued and were further strengthened. COSATU became 
closely linked with political parties and this close relationship would have significant 
implications for the industrial relations system in the democratic South Africa. The 
political changes that occurred in the early 1990s, such as the unbanning of the ANC and 
the release of Nelson Mandela, left the National Party government with little option but 
to recognise an agreement concluded by COSATU, the South African Employers’ 
Consultative Committee in Labour Affairs (SACCOLA) and the National Congress of 
Trade Unions (NACTU) on 14 September 1990 titled the ‘Laboria Minute’.
178
 This 
document set the stage for the next piece of labour legislation that would be enacted. It 
provided for a multi-party consultative process between all relevant parties before any 
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South Africa experienced several changes in the twentieth century. Some changes were 
economic and political whilst others related to its labour relations system. South Africa’s 
economy grew and shifted from being primarily based on mining and agriculture to 
being based on manufacturing. Politically, the National Party introduced and 
implemented its apartheid policy which led to political tensions as well as tensions in 
labour. These economic and political factors had a significant impact on the industrial 
relations system. 
 
The 1924 and 1956 labour legislation created racial tensions within the labour 
market. African unions started off weak and unorganized, however with the passage of 
time and the increased repression by government these unions were forced to grow 
stronger. The introduction and growth of the manufacturing sector as well as the 
employment of African workers in this sector led to the growth in union membership. 
Although they experienced some growing pains between the 1930s and the 1960s, by the 
start of the 1970s they had realised the importance of collective bargaining and 
achieving real gains for their members. Their focus in the years to come would be 
recruiting new members and negotiating for their better employment conditions. 
 
During this period African unions realised that they were unable to divorce the 
economic issues from the political issues. The political and economic repression 
experienced by the African population meant that unions became both political and 
labour entities. In addition, the growth in the manufacturing sector meant that there were 
large concentrations of African workers in certain locations. These workers were 
relatively militant and thus willing to embark on mass industrial action, as had been 
proven by the Durban strikes. Workers at that time had a common and easily identifiable 
identity. They found common ground on political and labour issues. The growth in 
numbers unions experienced came from the African workers’ united opposition against a 
racist government and a racist industrial relations system. Thus unions at this point had 
become more militant and more organized.  
 
African unions made the shop floor their recruitment base. They were prohibited 












industrial councils. They thus gained strength at plant level and bargained with 
employers at plant level. This meant that bargaining took place at individual firms and at 
industrial councils; something that would become problematic in the future. This period 









































The start of democracy in South Africa led to a new regulatory era for labour. The new 
government faced many political, legislative and socio-economic issues which had to be 
addressed. One of the first issues the new government had to attend to was the regulation 
of labour and the labour legislation it had inherited from the previous administration. 
The new government replaced the old statutory dispensation with a new statutory 
framework. This chapter begins by discussing the concerns unions, employers and 
government faced at the time the new labour dispensation was created. It explores these 
concerns and how they gave the bargaining system established by the new legal 
dispensation its particular characteristics.  
 
2. THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
2.1 Background 
By the start of the early nineties it was clear that the time for change in the statutory 
framework regulating labour was both inevitable and imminent. Furthermore, the strong 
bond formed between COSATU and the ANC during the 1980s ensured that when the 
ANC came into power in April 1994, addressing the labour system was one of its top 
priorities.
180
 A number of issues had arisen during the late 1970s and 1980s between 
unions and employers. These issues had been created by the bargaining structures and 
legislative restrictions established by the 1956 LRA together with the amendments to the 
1956 LRA in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In terms of collective bargaining, unions 
and employers had been confronted with issues relating to bargaining levels, industrial 
councils and the duty to bargain.  
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When it came to determining the appropriate bargaining level, African unions, 
which had been excluded from industrial councils by legislation, tended to bargain at 
plant level, whilst employers had generally bargained at industrial councils. African 
unions had organised at plant level thus this is where their strength lay. Therefore, when 
the 1956 LRA was amended to allow African unions to bargain at industrial councils 
there was some reluctance on their part to do so. Employers were generally reluctant to 
bargain with African unions altogether. Employers tended to refuse to bargain with 
unions at plant level and cited their industrial council membership as a reason.
181
 
However, once African unions began to join the industrial councils employers, began to 
resist centralised bargaining and advocated for decentralised bargaining instead.
182
 
Bargaining levels thus became an issue the 1956 LRA was unable to adequately deal 
with and thus something the new labour dispensation would have to address. 
 
 The role of industrial councils also emerged as an issue during this period. 
Industrial councils had been established by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924.
183
 
Their history made some African unions and their members wary of industrial councils 
as they tended to associate them with those problematic areas of the bargaining 
system.
184
 The 1924 and 1956 Acts permitted only registered unions and registered 
employers’ associations to form an industrial council for bargaining purposes. 
Therefore, until 1979 African unions were prohibited from registering as unions and thus 
were unable to negotiate at industrial councils.
185
 Some of the unions permitted to 
register and bargain at industrial councils had used industrial councils to benefit their 
members, who were generally skilled white workers. Some African unions therefore 
viewed industrial councils as institutions which had helped to perpetuate the suppression 
of African workers and the dual race bargaining structure. The new labour legislation 
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would have to determine whether or not they would remain a part of South Africa’s 
bargaining structure. 
 
The 1979 amendments to the 1956 LRA created the Industrial Court which was 
tasked with dealing with those matters relating to labour disputes. The Industrial Court 
developed unfair labour practice jurisprudence which made a distinction between 
disputes of interest and disputes of right. The court did not hear any matters concerning 
disputes of interest as these were left to power play, whilst disputes of right were open to 
adjudication.
186
 Issues surrounding collective bargaining and the duty to bargain were 
regarded as disputes of interest. Whenever disputes relating to the duty to bargain arose 
the court was unable to provide clear guidance on the matter as its jurisprudence was 
inconsistent and problematic. It eventually held that ‘employers had a broad duty to 
bargain in good faith’.
187
 However, the court did not provide guidance on the level 
parties were to engage in collective bargaining.
188
 Therefore, bargaining levels as well as 
the principle of voluntarism were issues the new labour legislation would need to 
resolve. 
 
The issues mentioned above were some of the matters the new labour legislation 
would need to address. Interested parties were anxious to not only be a part of the 
change, but to ensure that the changes they envisioned would become a part of the new 
statutory framework. There were three main parties involved; trade unions, employers 
and the ANC, which was to later become government.  
  
The ANC had developed the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) before coming to power.
189
 It was created in order to ensure ‘the integration of 
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growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution in a unified programme’.
190
 It 
dealt with collective bargaining amongst other issues. It saw South Africa with a 
centralised collective bargaining system with ‘articulation between the national, 
industrial and workplace levels’.
191
 In addition, the RDP proposal envisioned a 
collective bargaining system which kept the industrial councils.
192
 COASTU, which 
represented a significant number of African unions, had a detailed plan regarding its 
goals for collective bargaining.
193
 The unions that formed COSATU wanted bargaining 
to occur at sectoral level. It desired a centralised bargaining system which would 
demarcate industry into different sectors, with each sector having a centralised 
bargaining forum. COSATU sought commitment from the ANC that it would pressurize 
employers to engage in centralised bargaining in those sectors which did not have 
bargaining forums.
194
 Although it envisioned a system with voluntary bargaining, it did 
propose ‘seeking compulsory bargaining if the changes it proposed’ were unable to 
achieve the desired results.
195
 Employers had begun to resist the idea of centralised 
bargaining as well as the industrial council system.
196
 They were against any form of 
compulsory bargaining and thus motivated to retain the voluntarist system that had 
always been in place.
197
 Furthermore, the small, medium and micro enterprises (SMME) 
sector wanted a ‘blanket exemption from labour legislation and industrial council 
agreements’.
198





It was thus up to the new legislation to find a happy medium between these 
different and competing interests. After the ANC came into power in April 1994 it 
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dismantled the Department of Manpower and created the Department of Labour.
200
 It 
then commissioned a task team to draft a new Labour Relations Act.
201
 The National 
Manpower Commission and the National Economic Forum were abolished and they 
were substituted with National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC).
202
 NEDLAC was made up of four chambers; ‘Trade and Industry; Public 
Finance and Monetary Policy; Labour Market and Development’ and ‘government, 
organised labour and organised business had equal representation in each chamber’.
203
 
The idea behind NEDLAC was consensus. It was a decision making body established to 
ensure that any piece of labour legislation presented to Parliament represented the views 
of the community, unions, government and business. Negotiating the new LRA was to 




2.2. LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995  
The new Labour Relations Act
205
 faced a difficult task, it needed to please all parties 
involved whilst simultaneously ensuring that it did not stifle economic growth.
206
 The 
new Act represented a blend of the old and the new. It repealed the Labour Relations Act 
of 1956 and its subsequent amendments,
207
 but retained some features from the past 
system whilst introducing new structures and rights. When it came to collective 
bargaining, the LRA stated that it intended to  
 
‘promote orderly collective bargaining, collective bargaining at sectoral level [and] 
workers’ participation and decision-making at the workplace’.208 
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The Act therefore addressed some of the concerns some parties had concerning the duty 
to bargain, the fate of industrial councils and bargaining levels.  
 
2.2.1. Duty to bargain 
The parties negotiating the new LRA settled on a collective bargaining system which 
was essentially voluntarist.
209
 This was based on South Africa’s collective bargaining 
history as well as international norms. South Africa’s first comprehensive piece of 
legislation, the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act,
210
 introduced voluntary collective 
bargaining and the amendments that had been made to the Act had retained the 
voluntarist system. Furthermore, when South Africa became a democratic nation it was 
able to re-join the international community it had been excluded from during the 
apartheid era. The new democracy therefore began to align itself with the various 
international conventions that applied at the time. In the sphere of labour, international 
labour norms were regulated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The ILO 
had the Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to 
Organise and to Bargain Collectively
211
 which spoke to the issue of voluntarism in 
collective bargaining. The Convention states that 
  
‘[m]easures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to 
encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary 
negotiation between employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ 
organisations...’  
 
Therefore, international law advocated for voluntarist collective bargaining systems.  
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The drafters of the 1995 LRA realised that it was necessary to balance the 
voluntary duty to bargain with other measures and so they ensured that the 1995 LRA 
protected the right to resort to industrial action
212
 and it also created organisational 
rights.
213
 The Act permitted unions to strike if an employer was unwilling to come to the 
bargaining table. They were thus entitled to use their power to coerce the employer into 
negotiations ‘after conciliation measures ha[d] been exhausted’.
214
 The ‘recognition of 
bargaining agents, the choice of bargaining levels and the scope of the bargaining 
agenda and bargaining conduct’ were thus left to negotiation between the employer and 




The ‘statutory set of organisational rights for representative trade unions’ was 
available to ‘sufficiently representative’ and majority unions.
216
 Unions ‘sufficiently 
representative’ were entitled to the right to access the employer’s premises, the right 
deduct subscriptions, and the right to leave for trade union office bearer,
217
 whilst unions 
with majority representation were entitled to the right to elect shop stewards and the 
right to information for bargaining and monitoring purposes.
 218
 In the past unions would 
have had to negotiate for these rights but the 1995 LRA granted them automatically to 
‘sufficiently representative’ and majority unions as a way of assisting unions in 
bargaining.  
 
Therefore, the 1995 LRA adopted a voluntarist approach and counter-weighed 
this with the right to resort to industrial action and organisational rights. The courts were 
therefore prohibited from intervening and creating a duty to bargain.
219
 Government, 
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employers and unions thus chose to make collective bargaining dependent on the level 
of unions’ representivity and the aggressiveness of their membership.  
 
2.2.2. Industrial councils and bargaining levels 
The 1995 LRA retained the industrial councils, however it renamed them ‘bargaining 
councils’. This became necessary ‘once it became accepted that they would perform a 
role outside of industry – in the public service, the agriculture sector and for domestic 
workers, but to name three’.
220
 Retaining bargaining councils ensured that wages and 
conditions of employment could be regulated at sectoral level.
221
 They were empowered 
to ‘set minimum employment standards and establish pension, sick and other welfare 
funds.
222
 They were also given the powers to provide dispute resolution services to 




One of the primary purposes of the Act was to promote centralised collective 
bargaining.
224
 The drafters of the 1995 LRA believed that  
 
‘many of the challenges economic restructuring presents to major industries [would] 




Bargaining councils thus assisted in promoting centralised collective bargaining. They 
were free to conclude collective agreements. The collective agreement would be legally 
binding and it automatically changed the contracts of all employees subject to the 
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 If the parties to the agreement covered the majority of workers within a 
sector they could make an application to the Minister requesting an extension of their 
collective agreement.
227
 The extension of collective agreements protected the bargaining 
council scheme established by the Act. It stopped employers who were not party to the 
collective agreements from posing unfair competition’ to their competitors bound by the 
collective agreement’.
228
 If collective agreements could not be extended to non-parties  
 
‘the non-parties would be able to pay employees at rates which [were] lower than those 
which their competitors who [were] party to the agreement [had] to pay to their 
employees…[and] this would seriously discourage orderly collective bargaining in 




Therefore, although parties were free to settle on a particular level of bargaining 
amongst themselves, the Act promoted centralised bargaining at sectoral level. 
 
2.2.3. Worker participation 
The 1995 LRA created two vehicles for employee participation. Collective bargaining 
was chosen as the main vehicle.
230
 The collective voice was meant to be ‘a 
countervailing source of power to management [expressed] through unionisation and 
collective bargaining in particular’.
231
 The use of the collective voice as a form of 
employee participation in the workplace and industry was the traditional form of 
articulation in South Africa. The collective voice had been the main mode of expression 
employees had used since the 1924 Act, therefore it was the obvious choice. Workplace 
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forums were the second vehicle chosen.
232
 Workplace forums were based on worker 
participation at plant level. Workplace forums were different to collective bargaining in 
that collective bargaining was concerned with ‘how the cake should be cut’ whereas 
workplace forums were based on the idea of ‘participative decision-making, integrative 
in nature, by which the cake [could] be made to grow bigger’.
233
 Therefore, this form of 
voice articulation was ‘concerned with improvements in work organisation and 
efficiency’.
234
 Unfortunately workplace forums have not been used as both employers 
and unions were suspicious of workplace forums from the beginning.
235
 Employers 
believed they would undermine their ‘managerial prerogative’ whilst unions feared their 




3. STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS 
When legislators make laws they aim to address a particular ‘mischief’ at that time, thus 
they take past issues and inequities and they try to remedy them through legislation.
237
 
When the relevant parties and the drafters of the 1995 LRA came together they were 
concerned with remedying a specific ‘mischief’ and the solutions they created were 
coloured by past and present experiences. In the context of labour law, the drafters of the 
1995 LRA had to address issues regarding bargaining levels, industrial councils and the 
duty to bargain. These were some of the issues that had come to the fore during the late 
1970s and 1980s. The 1995 LRA chose to address these issues by establishing a 
collective bargaining system that was voluntarist in nature and balanced by 
organisational rights as well as the right to resort to industrial action. The 1995 LRA 
also promoted centralised collective bargaining. This was to be supported by the 
establishment of bargaining councils and the extension of collective agreements in those 
sectors where employers and unions covered the majority of workers in the sector.  
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The collective bargaining system set up thus implicitly required unions to have a 
large membership. From the 1960s the manufacturing sector had grown to become the 
biggest sector.
238
 It was labour intensive and thus employed a large section of the 
workforce, including the largest group of African workers.
239
 The concentration of 
capital in industry had thus led to a concentration of African workers in the industrial 
sector,
240
 resulting in the migration of large numbers of African workers from rural to 
urban areas. Although the manufacturing sector had experienced a decline in growth 
during the 1980s, it still remained the largest sector and employer.
241
 From a political 
perspective South Africans were increasingly willing to join organisations as a way of 
protesting against the repressive political situation in South Africa.
242
 Therefore, there 
was a growth in the membership of organisations within the community as well as 
amongst ‘school children and unemployed youth’ in African townships.
243
 This desire to 
organise was also accompanied by an increased militancy in the South African 
population, as evidenced by the 1973 strikes in Durban and the 1976 Soweto uprising.
244
 
Unions thus became an organisation workers desiring to change the political and 
economic status quo could join. South Africa’s political climate, economic infrastructure 
and frustrated population made it possible for unions to greatly increase their 
membership during the 1980s. Therefore, at the time the 1995 LRA was drafted and 
enacted unions had the necessary membership to compel bargaining and so it made 
sense to leave collective bargaining issues to be decided by representativity.  
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Unfortunately legislators are not omniscient. They are therefore unable to 
‘anticipate all the possible combinations of circumstance to which their rules might be 
applicable, and so they cannot estimate the contingencies that might arise to be 
determined’.
245
 The economic context in which the 1995 LRA was drafted and enacted 
has since changed. When the 1995 LRA was drafted the manufacturing industry was the 
biggest contributor to the economy and the main employer.
246
 However, the South 
African economy at that time was partially isolated and had created ‘inefficient and 
uncompetitive firms’.
247
 Therefore, when South Africa became a democracy in 1994 and 
simultaneously re-entered the global economy this exposed businesses operating in the 
national economy to ‘intense competition in a rapidly changing market’.
248
 This left the 





Initially the government based its economic policy on the RDP, however in 1996 
it opted for the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy’.
250
 GEAR 
thus became the foundation for economic and social policy.
251
 It emphasised economic 
growth through investment and production.
252
 It also emphasised trade liberalisation and 
flexibility.
253
 The globalised world market placed business under pressures they had not 
been exposed to during the apartheid era. Consequently, the 1995 LRA soon came under 
attack from employers as ‘perpetuating and increasing rigidities in the labour market 
with the deleterious effect on global competitiveness’.
254
 Employers argued for the 
introduction of labour market flexibility
255
 as there was a feeling that the labour laws 
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introduced since 1994 had introduced rigidities into the South African labour market, 
which deterred investors and impeded the flexibility needed to compete globally.
256
 This 
call for flexibility would have a serious impact on the effectiveness of the collective 
bargaining system created by the 1995 LRA in the years to come. 
 
CONCLUSION 
When South Africa’s democratic era commenced the drafters of the new labour law 
dispensation were faced with the task of addressing a number of issues that had arisen 
under the previous dispensation. In the collective bargaining context the new 
dispensation would need to resolve matters pertaining to the duty to bargain, bargaining 
levels as well as the fate of industrial councils. Unions, employers and government came 
together and made their contributions to the 1995 LRA. Ultimately the 1995 LRA 
resolved these issues. However, it did so by creating a collective bargaining system 
heavily reliant on the representivity levels of unions. At the time the 1995 LRA was 
drafted unions had not experienced any major problems recruiting and organising new 
members. The growth in the industrial sector, the repressive political atmosphere as well 
as the general discontent of the South African populace enabled unions to recruit large 
numbers. The drafters of the 1995 LRA thus did not make any provision within the Act 
assisting those unions struggling to recruit members. 
 
 The globalised economy in which South Africa now operates has changed the 
structure of South Africa’s economy as well the nature of work. Unions are finding it 
increasingly difficult to recruit and retain members and as a result their membership 
numbers have declined. The sections in the 1995 LRA which promote collective 
bargaining and make the bargaining process easier for unions rely on representivity thus 
making it harder for those unions struggling to recruit members to access certain rights 
in the 1995 LRA. The 1995 LRA has unfortunately been unable to assist unions. The 














current bargaining current system is thus struggling to meet the needs of all workers 


































Labour legislation is one of the methods states use to establish mechanisms which 
intervene in the market economy and try to regulate the consequences of market forces. 
In South Africa the 1995 LRA does this, in the context of collective bargaining, by 
establishing certain bargaining structures aimed at creating rules and processes that 
regulate bargaining between workers and employees. Statutory regulation identifies and 
remedies specific problems, however, no matter how all encompassing the legislation 
might be, it is unable to anticipate all the permutations that might arise within a specific 
context. Therefore once enacted, legislation becomes fairly inflexible and slow to adapt 
to any changes. The 1995 LRA is no exception to this. When it was drafted it created a 
bargaining system premised on a labour market where most of the employment 
relationships were standard employment relationships.  
 
South Africa’s re-integration into the world economy exposed it to the effects of 
globalisation. Globalisation altered South Africa’s economy as well as the nature of its 
employment. Globalisation processes resulted in the growth of atypical workers. 
Although non-standard employment was present in South Africa at the time the 1995 
LRA was drafted, the n wly elected government was unable to anticipate the full extent 
of its growth and the impact this would have on workers in the coming years. Although 
workers in non-standard employment are de jure covered by the 1995 LRA, atypical 
workers are increasingly unable to access the bargaining system set up in the Act. 
Through the use of empirical studies this chapter will look at how the collective 
bargaining system set up by the 1995 LRA to regulate bargaining between employers 
and workers is battling to accommodate atypical workers.  
 












Statutory regulation can take various forms. It can be protective in nature or it can be 
facilitative.
257
 If it is protective in nature it tends to ‘establish rules and procedures 
aimed at preventing those in strong positions from abusing those in weak positions’ and 
if it is facilitative then it ‘[establishes] rules and procedures that allow certain activities 
to take place should parties wish to do so’.
258
 The sections regulating collective 
bargaining in the 1995 LRA are essentially facilitative in nature as they assist potential 
bargaining agents in establishing bargaining procedures and bargaining rights. At the 
time the 1995 LRA was drafted South African unions enjoyed considerable growth in 
union membership. They had also been able to bargain with an increasing number of 
employers, whether on plant or sectoral level. Therefore at the time the LRA was 
drafted, facilitative regulations seemed the most appropriate within the collective 
bargaining context. 
 
Statutory regulation, though beneficial on the most part, does tend to be rigid and 
inflexible.
259
 Furthermore, it is impossible for any law to make provision for every 
contingency.
260
 Although regulations create certainty, which is a positive characteristic 
in any legal system, this certainty ‘may undermine the system’s efficiency and 
encourage avoidance and evasion’.
261
 This has been the case in South Africa. First, the 
1995 LRA was designed for an economy based on a standard employment relationship 
and this is no longer the case. This has been as a result of the effect of globalisation 
processes on the economy as well as employers restructuring their employment set-up to 
accommodate the economic pressures they are now facing. Consequently there has been 
shift in the economy which has affected the manufacturing industries and a resultant 
high turnover of atypical workers which has made the recruiting, organising and 
retention of members by unions difficult.
262
 Unions have thus found it increasingly 
difficult to represent atypical workers and bargain on their behalf. Therefore the 
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collective bargaining mechanism set up in the 1995 LRA is battling to accommodate a 
growing section of the labour force. This will be illustrated by the two empirical studies 
that follow below. 
 
2.1. South Africa’s construction sector 
Construction is divided into two sectors, civil engineering and building.  
 
‘The building sector involves erection, completion and renovation of buildings and 
structures. Civil engineering involves the construction of public works such as roads, 




The building sector provides a useful case study as it has a number of bargaining 
councils18 established in terms of the 1995 LRA. Furthermore, the building sector is 
now facing considerable pressure from the globalisation processes which has had an 
impact on the nature of employment and the collective bargaining structures set up in the 
sector. Therefore, there are increasing instances of casualisation and externalisation, 
which in turn are resulting in informalisation. It is these two factors combined which 
make the building sector an appropriate case study.  
 
The building sector has always been characterised by very mobile operations.
264
 
This is because construction work usually occurs at the location of the construction site 
rather than at the construction firm itself.
265
 The availability of jobs within the 
construction sector has always fluctuated as construction work is based on completing a 
project and moving on the next. Therefore, work arrangements within the building sector 
have always been precarious. However, despite this, construction workers formed part of 
the formal business structure taking part in tax payments and benefit systems.
266
 This is 
no longer the case. There has been a decrease in formal employment experienced in the 
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industry since 1994, due largely to retrenchments from large construction firms.
267
 
Statistics indicate that major construction firms have reduced their formal employees 
from ‘thousands to a few hundred’.
268





The South African construction sector relies heavily on sub-contractors. Sub-
contracting in itself is not new to the construction sector.
270
 Traditional sub-contracting 
has always been present in the sector. It established itself in the sector by providing 
contractors workers with special skills. These traditional sub-contractors were able to 
conduct their work autonomously and thus they operated independently of the 
contractor.
271
 They therefore provided two things, specially-skilled labour and materials. 
This part of the sector has been relatively unaffected by the changes in employment and 
has managed to maintain its size and function within the sector. In contracts, labour only 
sub-contractors (LOSCs) are a newer form of sub-contracting which has emerged in the 
last fifteen years. LOSCs provide a different kind of service from traditional sub-
contractors, and their growth in the sector is a direct result of the economic pressures 
experienced by the sector.
272
 LOSCs just provide general labour and they work less 
autonomously than traditional sub-contractors.
273
 They perform general construction 
work and depend on the contractor to supply materials.
274
 LOSCs have become the 
‘most dominant form of non-standard employment in the construction sector’. Currently, 




LOSCs are mainly responsible for the growth of casualisation in the construction 
sector.
276
 Contractors, together with LOSCs use fixed-term contracts to meet the changes 
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in their workload, thus linking their staffing with their workload.
277
. Studies conducted 
in the sector in 2003 indicated that over half of the workers in the industry are employed 
by firms which employ ‘less than ten regular workers’.
278
 Whilst, only ‘fourteen percent 
work in companies with fifty or more regular workers’.
279
 A 2011 COSATU Report 
states that the construction sector now has ‘the most casualisation than any other sector’ 
with casualised workers making up close to sixty per cent of the workers in the sector.
280
 
Externalisation is also found in the construction sector. Usually firms of contractors 
encourage a group of artisans to terminate their employment with them and form a small 
team.
281
 These former employees either become independent contractors or a sub-
contractor their former employer uses. This means that the employer will no longer 
interact with the workers via an employment contract instead, their interaction will be 
based on a commercial contract.
282
 The structure of LOSCs, and in some cases, their 
lack of structure contributes to informalisation within the sector. LOSCs are unregulated 
with a minimal number registering with bargaining councils and complying with 
collective agreements or labour legislation.
283
 For instance, the Southern and Eastern 
Cape Bargaining Council estimates that approximately half of the employees working in 




LOSCs do not comply with legislation or bargaining council agreements when it 
comes to wages and terms and conditions of employment thus atypical workers earn less 
wages and under less favourable conditions than their permanently employed 
counterparts. It is in this instance that the bargaining structure set up by the 1995 LRA is 
most needed to assist a group of workers in negotiating for better wages and terms and 
conditions of employment. For a union to bring an employer to the bargaining table it 
must have enough members to compel the employer to bargain should the employer be 
unwilling to do so. However, unions in the building sector have been unable to gain the 
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membership necessary to access organisational rights and compel employers to negotiate 
about the employment conditions of atypical workers.  
 
The 1995 LRA states that the representivity of a union is to be calculated with 
reference to the workplace. The workplace is defined as  
 
‘the place or places where the employees of an employer work. If an employer carries on 
or conducts two or more operations that are independent of one another by reason of 
their size, function or organisation, the place or places where employees work in 





The definition of a ‘workplace’ makes it difficult for unions in the building sector to 
calculate the levels of their representivity. The definition is premised on the type of 
workplace common to a standard employment relationship in the manufacturing sector 
rather than the construction industry generally which does not have a fixed workplace as 
the workplace is never the same. 
 
Despite the fact that the construction sector is highly labour intensive, unions 
have found it difficult to recruit and organise atypical workers. Labour within this sector 
is highly fragmented. There are fixed-term contract employees working for contractors 
and LOSCs as well as informal workers working for LOSCs from time to time. In 
addition, these workers are located all over the place. These workers also lack a common 
identity making recruitment even more difficult. The African workers who excluded 
from the collective bargaining system were able to come together as a collective, despite 
the challenges they faced, because they worked together in one workplace. They thus 
shared a collective camaraderie amongst themselves and thus it was easier for unions to 
recruit them as a collective at the workplace. Atypical workers within the construction 
sector lack this sense of collective camaraderie. The high turn-over means they hardly 
have time to form any meaningful bonds with other workers. Furthermore, the highly 
competitive nature of the sector results in workers within the industry viewing each 
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other as competition rather than as colleagues, thus exacerbating the matter. The LRA 
creates a structure which supports collective bargaining, however it is evident that 
workers within this sector are no longer in an environment which makes it possible to 
form a collective. Thus statistics indicate that unions only represent thirteen per cent of 
the workforce.  
 
The inability to recruit workers threatens the centralised bargaining system the 
1995 LRA promotes. The 1995 LRA creates bargaining councils which operate at 
sectoral level. They are intended to afford workers a chance to effect change at sectoral 
level. During the 1990s the building sector had ten bargaining councils,
286
 however, the 
mechanism has become difficult for workers to access. Most bargaining councils have 
collapsed and of the six that remain only two are properly perational. The bargaining 
councils in Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Kroonstad and Gauteng have collapsed.
287
 The 
Bloemfontein, East London and Southern and Eastern Cape bargaining councils are still 
in existence however that existence is not guaranteed in the long term.
288
 The Cape 
Council and the Kimberley Council are the only two fully functioning councils.
289
 The 
collapse has been as a result of two things; first, LOSC’s disregard for bargaining 
council agreements and second, low representivity. The Act only permits the Minister to 
extend a bargaining council agreement if the parties to the agreement represent the 
majority of workers in a sector. Unions have found it difficult to recruit members and 
thus they have been unsuccessful in their attempts to have bargaining councils 
agreements extended. This has ultimately undermined centralised bargaining within the 
sector. It is thus evident that the 1995 LRA is struggling to assist atypical workers in 
changing their working circumstances. 
 
2.2 South Africa’s retail sector 
Over the last couple of decades South Africa’s retail sector has grown in size and 
diversity. Statistics in 2010 indicated that the sector now has 80 353 retailers, ranging 
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from ‘large corporations listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, to a myriad of 
small cafes and informal undertakings, largely in the townships...’.
290
 The sector is made 
up of smaller sub-sectors covering ‘food, clothing and furniture/household items’.
291
 
Historically, the retail sector has been highly competitive. Consequently, the sector has 
always altered the manner in which business has been conducted in order to maintain 
profitability since the 1960s.
292
 The first significant changes began in the 1960s when 
chain-stores started to take-over smaller retailers. By the 1980s, these chain stores had 
expanded and become hypermarkets.
293
 Although the structure of the retail sector 
altered, the changes implemented focused on the nature of the business and thus did not 
greatly impact upon labour until the late 1980s.  
 
From the 1990s the retail sector began to experience increased pressure. This was 
due to the effects of globalisation on the sector. In order for retailers to remain 
competitive they needed to be able to address ‘increased competition and the cyclical 
nature of consumer demand’. An increasing amount of convenience stores were 
established offering consumers their services for extended hours. Consequently, retailers 
had to extend their hours ‘of opening on evenings and weekends’ in order to attract these 
consumers. This affected the working hours of workers within the sector. Retailers had 
to increase their operational efficiency by dealing directly with manufacturers, thus 
minimising the role of the wholesaler.
294
 ‘Wholesalers are now mainly transacting with 
small businesses and informal traders, who buy directly from them’.
295
 This has 
decreased the need for certain categories of staff within the retail store. 
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These various pressures have impacted the nature of employment within the 
sector as retailers have tried to increase their declining profit margins by decreasing their 
wage bill.
296
 This has been achieved through the casualization and externalisation of 
labour.
297
 The casualization of the labour force within the retail sector has been 
increasing over the last two decades and in the larger retail stores casual workers now 
make up the ‘largest percentage of workers in this category’.
298
 The number of casual 
workers within the retail sector has more than doubled since 1997 with just over 40 per 
cent of the labour force being made up of casual workers.
299
 These tend to be cashiers 
and packers.
300
 The retail sector has used casualization to absorb the effects of the ebbs 
and flows of business. Casual workers are employed in accordance with the peak and 
off-peak periods a retail store might experience. The retail sector thus uses casual 





Externalisation within the sector takes the form of both outsourcing and sub-
contracting.
302
 Although retailers have been outsourcing ‘non-core functions such as 
cleaning, security and maintenance’ since the 1980s, the trend has increased in the last 
few decades.
303
 In addition, the task of stocking shelves has now been sub-contracted to 
merchandisers.
304
 The general practice is for manufacturers to employ merchandisers to 
stock the retailers’ shelves.
305
 This therefore means that although merchandisers are 
employed by the supplier, their workplace is at the premises of the retailers.
306
 Thus a 
merchandiser might work at several retail stores in the space of a day, week or month. 
The externalisation of labour in the retail sector has meant that retailers are no longer 
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largely responsible for paying the wages and benefits, such as pensions and medical aid, 
for externalized workers, this responsibility now falls on the shoulders of the sub-
contractors and companies providing out-sourced services. 
 
The informal economy in the retail sector has undergone growth. By 2010 just 
under half of the workers in the retail sector were employed by informal businesses.
307
 
Retailers in the informal sector are made up of ‘unregistered general dealers, corner 
shops, [and] spaza shops’.
308
 Although these enterprises are de jure regulated by the 
applicable laws within South Africa, most of these businesses ‘avoid...regulations such 
as the payment of tax and registering their employees for UIF and COIDA’.
309
 Thus, the 
workers employed by informal businesses do not de facto enjoy the protection of ‘labour 




These changes introduced to the nature of employment within the retail sector 
have impacted negatively on the wages, benefits and working hours of employees. 
Generally, atypical workers within the sector earn less, have fewer benefits and work 
longer than their counterparts in standard employment relationships.
311
 Atypical workers 
in this sector also enjoy less employment security. Casual workers are easier to fire than 
permanent workers, and the responsibility for firing externalised workers lies with their 
employer and not the retailer. For instance, a retailer can request a manufacturer to fire a 
merchandiser without dealing with the consequences. Atypical workers are thus more 
vulnerable and in need of improved wages and terms and conditions of employment.  
 
Unions therefore, have role to play in improving the wages as well as the terms 
and conditions of employment for atypical workers. Although the retail sector is labour 
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intensive, historically it has always been difficult to organise.
312
 The fragmentation of 
the labour force has made it difficult for unions to recruit and retain members. 
Therefore, there has never been a bargaining council within the sector.
313
 Bargaining has 
traditionally taken place between unions and individual firms, with the remainder of the 
workers within the sector being covered by ‘wage determination’.
314
 This is still the 
case. SACCAWU, which is the biggest union operating in the sector, has tried establish 
a bargaining council within the sector for a number of years, with no success.
315
 The 
union believes that the only way the wages and terms and conditions of employment of 





The 1995 LRA establishes mechanisms which facilitate collective bargaining and 
promote centralised collective bargaining. It does this by creating rules and procedures 
which facilitate bargaining between unions and employers as well as the establishment 
of bargaining councils within sectors. In order for a union to engage in meaningful 
centralised collective bargaining it must represent at least a ‘sufficient’ number of 
workers within the sector. In addition, the centralised bargaining must be supported by 
the extension of collective agreements to the rest of sector. In order to do this the parties 
to a collective agreement must cover the majority of workers within the sector. These 
facilitative structures established by the 1995 LRA have struggled to assist SACCAWU 
in creating a bargaining council.  
 
Currently, the union’s representivity levels are extremely low with only five per 
cent of the workers in the sector represented by a union.
317
 These low levels are due to a 
combination of factors. First, the manner in which the representivity of a union is 
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calculated has made it difficult for unions to have high representivity levels. The 
representivity of unions in South Africa is calculated with reference to the employer’s 
workplace. In the retail sector the employer’s workplace consists of all the branches a 
retailer might have, whether this is within a city, a province or nationwide.
318
 Therefore, 
the representivity levels of a union are calculated by looking at the number of members a 
union has in relation to all the workers a retailer has. This has made it very difficult for 
unions operating within the sector like SACCAWU to become representative. 
 
The casualization and externalisation of workers within this sector has created a 
group of workers difficult to organise. Casual and externalised workers are difficult to 
access as they are mobile and frequently move from one workplace to another. The 
mobility of casual workers within the retail sector is detrimental to the calculation of a 
union’s representivity levels as they tend to be at one employer’s workplace today and at 
another employer’s workplace tomorrow. Externalised workers do not work at their 
employer’s workplace and move from one client’s workplace to another thus making it 
difficult for unions to gain access to them for recruitment purposes. Workers located in 
the informal sector are also difficult to access. Some are located in small enterprises 
located throughout the country or at their employer’s residential premises. Recruiting 
within this sector of retail is arduous as small numbers of workers are dotted throughout 
the country. Even if unions were to overcome all these obstacles, they would still face 
resistance from the atypical workers. Workers in non-standard employment are harder to 
persuade to join unions as they believe that unions cannot cater to both workers in 




Therefore, the effects of casualization, externalisation and the informal sector 
have weakened the trade unions organising in the retail sector. The 1995 LRA has 
struggled to provide meaningful assistance to unions such as SACCAWU which desire 
















to establish bargaining councils within the sector for centralised collective bargaining. 




The South African economy has been exposed to the world economy since the early 
1990s. The sections in the 1995 LRA establishing the collective bargaining system are 
facilitative in nature as they create the rules and procedures parties are to use when 
bargaining. Thus the Act regulates the market forces by creating rules of engagement. At 
the time the 1995 LRA was drafted this was sufficient intervention on the Act’s part. 
The economy and labour force were sheltered from the effects of the world economy. 
The Act was thus created to function within the context of the labour-intensive primary 
and secondary sectors and standard employment relationships. Unions had been 
relatively successful in recruiting, organising and retaining membership in this type of 
economic context since the 1970s. They thus primarily needed legislation to assist them 
in facilitating bargaining processes between them and employers. 
 
The drafters of the 1995 LRA did not fully anticipate the changes that 
globalisation would bring. The various processes introduced by globalisation changed 
South Africa’s economy as well as the nature of employment. Globalisation has resulted 
in the primary and secondary sectors in South Africa’s economy facing increasing 
pressure. This has led to a decline within these sectors as well as to the general change in 
the nature of employment thus altering the context within which the 1995 LRA operates. 
Globalisation has increased the number of atypical workers in South Africa. The 
empirical studies from the construction and retail sector show that these workers tend to 
work in employment situations which offer little job and wage security. Furthermore 
they typically earn less and are employed on less favourable terms than their 
permanently employed counterparts. It is therefore evident that the wages and terms and 













However, the bargaining system established in the 1995 LRA has struggled to 
help atypical workers achieve this. In the building sector, the 1995 LRA has battled to 
assist unions and employers in maintaining the bargaining councils in the sector. 
Consequently, only two bargaining councils remain. In the retail sector, the 1995 LRA 
has struggled to facilitate the establishment of a bargaining council, despite the efforts of 
unions within the sector like SACCAWU. Therefore, the facilitative processes 
established by the Act are no longer enough to protect atypical workers from the 
negative effects of the market. The 1995 LRA has been unable to adequately adapt and 
protect atypical workers from the changes introduced by globalisation. There is thus a 
need to introduce more flexible forms of regulation that are able to adapt to the changes 




























‘Labour markets involve a series of repeated exchanges...between capital and labour’.
320
 
They are affected by a host of cultural, institutional, legal and political mechanisms.
321
 
Together these mechanisms constitute labour market regulation.
322
 The regulation of 
labour markets has an impact on ‘the rate of job creation and destruction, levels of 
employment and unemployment, productivity, wages, degree of social protection and 
justice afforded workers’.
323
 In South Africa we use a combination of statutory 
regulation and collective voice regulation to regulate the labour market. The aim is to 
‘advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of 
the workplace...’.
324
 However, the current model is battling to achieve this, especially 
within the context of atypical workers. This chapter examines the various mechanisms 
which can be adopted to support the collective bargaining system established by the 
1995 LRA as a collective voice regulatory mechanism and ensure the effective 
representation of atypical workers and their protection from the inequalities of the 
market forces as well as their ability to improve the terms and conditions of their 
employment. 
 
2. LABOUR MARKET REGULATION 
There are three main ways in which labour can be regulated.
325
 Regulation can be 
‘market based, statutory or based on collective voice’.
326
 Market based regulation occurs 
when ‘authorities seek to maximise reliance on market forces and use legislation and 
other regulatory systems’ such as individual employment contracts.
327
 This form of 
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regulation relies on ‘power and control’ to govern the market,
328
 therefore it promotes 
and exaggerates inequalities within the market.
329
 Workers tend to be more vulnerable 
and thus they usually find themselves in positions of weakness within the labour 
market.
330
 They occupy weak bargaining positions and thus have very little ability to 
improve their position within the market.
331
 Consequently, workers end up being 




The more common forms of labour market regulation make use of a combination 
of statutory and voice regulation.
333
 Statutory regulation occurs when the state 
intervenes directly via statute.
334
 Statutory regulation can refer to the ‘rules and 
procedures established by laws and decrees that govern aspects of the employment 
relationships’.
335
 It can also include those rules that create substantive standards ‘which 
regulate the individual employment relationship for example, by setting minimum 
wages, maximum working hours, basic health and safety standards...’.
336
 It is thus the 
classic understanding of regulation. Collective voice regulation, on the other hand, 
‘refers to voluntary negotiation and administration of the employment relationship 
where workers (and sometimes employers) are represented collectively’.
337
 It thus refers 
to those regulations which provide legal support for mechanisms of collective 
negotiation which allow collective bargaining to take place between employers and 
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Statutory regulation and collective voice regulation tend to be concerned with 
intervening in the market and trying to counteract its inegalitarian consequences. These 
regulations are usually protective and therefore ‘designed to prevent those in strong 
positions from abusing those in weak positions’.
339
 This form of regulation is supposed 
to limit ‘unfair competition’ between employers and provide them with guidance on 
labour standards’.
340
 It is also supposed to ‘enhance effective labour participation’ and 
provide employment security by protecting workers from ‘the arbitrary loss of 
employment’. In addition it is meant to ensure that workers earn a subsistence wage at 
the very least, as well as create ‘the secure capacity to bargain and influence the 
character of employment’.
341
 Therefore, statutory and collective voice regulation protect 
both employers and workers within the labour market. 
 
 Statutory regulation and collective voice regulation are often used together and to 
support each other as regulatory devices, as they each have their inherent strengths and 
weaknesses. Statutory regulation although ‘predictable, transparent and equitable’ can in 
certain instances be ‘rigid’, ‘complex’ and ‘prone to bureaucracy’.
342
 Collective voice 
regulation tends to be more flexible and able to ‘reduce the excesses of market forces 
and the rigidities of statutory regulation’.
343
 However, it is ‘time consuming’ since it 
‘involves explicit bargaining’ and it could also ‘intensify labour market inequalities and 
insecurity if the institutions exclude the interests of the more vulnerable groups’.
344
 
These two regulatory mechanisms used together complement each other as they balance 
each regulatory mechanism’s strength and weaknesses. 
 
 In South Africa the newly elected government in 1994 was committed to ‘redress 
the worst legacies of apartheid [by] facilitating community and economic development 
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to reduce the inequalities and poverty that were so severe’.
345
 One way to accomplish 
this was by instituting a combination of statutory as well as collective voice regulation 
as a form of labour market regulation. Statutory regulation is facilitated through the 
1995 LRA, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act,
346
 the Employment Equity Act,
347
 
the Skills Development Act and the Occupational Health and Safety Act
348
 which have 
been enacted to ensure that the inegalitarian consequences of the South African labour 
market are addressed. Collective voice regulation, on the other hand, is established by 
the 1995 LRA.
349





 in nature. It is facilitative in nature as it enables voluntary collective 
bargaining between employer(s) and unions representing employees to take place, by 
providing organisational rights available to ‘sufficiently representative’ and majority 
unions as well as a protected right to industrial action. It is also protective as it promotes 
centralised collective bargaining. This is done by ensuring that the collective agreements 
concluded at bargaining councils by parties representing the majority of workers within 
a sector are extended to all workers thus ensuring that all workers within a sector are 
protected.  
 
3. Possible solutions 
Collective bargaining as a means of regulating the market has exhibited certain 
weaknesses in the face of the changes introduced to the workplace by globalisation. The 
facilitative rules and procedures established by the 1995 LRA have struggled to adapt to 
the non-standard employment relationships that are growing within the South African 
labour market. Consequently, the structures created by the 1995 LRA to assist unions 
bargain like organisational rights and the protected right to resort to industrial action; are 
becoming increasingly harder for unions to access. Unions are also finding it difficult to 
recruit, organise and retain atypical workers therefore they have found it increasingly 
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difficult to represent atypical workers and aid them in improving their wages and terms 
and conditions of employment. The bargaining system is thus under pressure. One way 
of ensuring that the bargaining system is able to cater to atypical workers is by 
instituting some changes to the definition of ‘workplace’ in the 1995 LRA. The second 
way is through unions adopting new recruiting and bargaining strategies. These two 
changes might help the collective bargaining system adapt to and accommodate atypical 
workers. 
 
3.1. Legislative changes 
The 1995 LRA defines ‘workplace’ in section 213 as  
 
‘the place or places where the employees of an employer work. If an employer carries on 
or conducts two or more operations that are independent of one another by reason of 
their size, function or organisation, the place or places where employees work in 
connection with each independent operation, constitutes the workplace for that 
operation.’ 
 
This definition bases the idea of workplace on the notion of a standard employment 
relationship between workers and employers. The assumption made by the definition is 
that when workers perform their duties they will do so at the premises of their employer. 
This might have been the general state of affairs at the time the 1995 LRA was drafted, 
however this is no longer the case. The pressures of globalisation have led to changes in 
the nature of work and consequently not all workers work at the premises of their 
employer. They can be found performing their duties in other spaces. For instance, in the 
construction sector workers employed by LOSCs work at the client’s workplace and not 
their employer’s workplace. Similarly, merchandisers in the retail sector work at the 
retail store and not at their employer’s premises. Thus, within one location there can be a 














 This has made it difficult for unions to recruit and organise workers. For example 
if a union like SACCAWU wished to recruit merchandisers and exercise the 
organisational rights in the 1995 LRA, it would have to do so at the manufacturer’s 
workplace and not at the retailer’s workplace despite the fact that the merchandisers are 
mainly located at the retailer’s premises. The definition of ‘workplace’ is thus making it 
difficult for workers and unions to organise. The definition of workplace needs to shift 
its focus from the binary standard employment relationship. This can be done by 
amending the definition of workplace so it can accommodate several employers 
operating within one locale. The definition of workplace can thus be amended as such; 
 
‘The place where an employee or employees devote most of their working time; if an 
employee has duties of an itinerant nature the place where the employee returns to 
conduct administrative matters.’ 
 
This definition of the workplace focuses on the location rather than the relationship 
between employer and worker, consequently it allows for a multiplicity of employers in 
one location. For instance, a union can recruit and organise merchandisers who spend 
most of their time at a retailer’s store at the premises of the retailer. The union’s 
representivity levels can thus be calculated by referring to the place where the workers 
spend most of their time working rather than all the locations an employer might have. 
This would greatly assist unions as it would make it easier for them to access the rights 
in the 1995 LRA which support the voluntary duty to bargain. In the case of workers 
who travel from one job site to another, like those employed by LOSCs, unions could 
recruit workers where the LOSC’s offices are located, or even the premises of the 
contractor, depending on the nature and duration of the relationship between the LOSC 
and the contractor. Shifting the focus from the employer to the physical space within 
which workers perform their duties thus makes it easier for unions to access workers for 
recruitment and organisational purposes. 
 












Collective voice regulation refers to ‘the constructive role that collective bargaining 
between employees and employers play in resolving disputes and thereby promoting 
productivity and economic growth’.
352
 The notion of ‘voice’ however, is broader than 
that of collective voice regulation. The idea of voice was first used by Albert Hirschman 
in his ‘classic study of African Railways’ in 1970.
353
 Hirschman used the idea of voice 
to describe an avenue available to customers who wished to express their dissatisfaction 
with a service provider.
354
 Hirschman defines ‘voice’ as, 
 
‘any attempt to change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, 
whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly in charge, 
through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing change in management 





The concept of voice regulation was originally used to discuss the ways in which 
customers or members tried to change the ‘practices, policies, and outputs’ of the entity 
from which they made their purchases.
356
 It was therefore a mechanism used to analyse 
the behaviour of dissatisfied customers and members who did not have the option of 
leaving their service provider. Fourteen years later the concept of voice regulation was 
adopted by labour academics.
357
 Since then it has been used within the context of labour 





Although Hirschman gave voice a specific meaning in his text, the meaning of 
voice in terms of labour has been used to ‘refer to a whole variety of processes and 
structures which enable and at times empower employees directly and indirectly to 
                                                 
352
 Valodia op cit note 66 at 11. 
353
Dundon op cit note 231 at 5. 
354
 Albert O. Hirschman Exit, voice and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organisations and states 
(1970) 4. 
355




 This was first done by Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff in What do unions do? (1984). 
358












contribute to decision making in the firm’.
359
 Voice within a company or within the 
labour market can either be formal or informal. It can also be motivated by a range of 
intentions. These motivations can be simple, for instance the need to impart information, 
or more complex such as a joint consultative process where employers and employees 
share responsibility for decisions.
360
 Academics and practitioners have also made the 
distinction between ‘mandated voice’ where employers and workers are required to 
speak and ‘voluntary voice’ where the relevant parties can choose to meet.
361
 These 
various forms of voice can be implemented in different ways. They can be through 
‘trade union membership, recognition and representation; indirect or representative 





 The collective voice regulation mechanism established by the 1995 LRA has 
struggled to facilitate collective bargaining amongst atypical workers and thus these 
workers have been unable to use their collective voice to counter the negative effects of 
the market. In order for this collective voice regulation to ‘lead to redistributive justice’ 
within the market place the collective voice of atypical workers will have to find a way 
to be heard and effect change.
363
 This can be achieved by revisiting the broader notion of 
voice. Hirschman’s definition of voice includes the idea of using voice to influence 
public opinion and thus helping to create change within the organisation.
364
 Unions have 
traditionally targeted employers when attempting to effect change at the workplace. 
Despite the changes introduced by collective bargaining employers will always remain 
the primary focus of unions when trying to improve their members’ working conditions. 
However, unions can benefit from the growing importance of corporate governance to 
assist them in effecting greater change. Corporate governance is based on the idea that 
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the perceptions of the public can affect the reputation of a company.
365
 This can have 
either a positive or negative impact on the company. Unions can thus use corporate 
governance as an additional tool to pressurise companies into improving the terms and 
conditions of employment of workers like atypical workers. 
 
3.2.1 Corporate governance as a regulatory device 
Globalisation has resulted in the ‘breaking down of national economic boundaries, the 
liberalisation of international trade, finance and production activities and the growing 
power of transnational corporations (TNCs) and international financial institutions’.
366
 
Globalisation has led to the increasing influence of non-state actors such as companies 
within nations. This has meant that states no longer have the sole monopoly on creating 
and instituting policies which affect and influence their economy and labour market. The 
greater role that companies now play within countries has meant that their policies and 
actions affect economies and labour markets to a greater extent than before. However, 
this increased influence on the economy and on the labour market has not been 
accompanied by an increase in companies’ accountability for the impact they have on 
economies and labour markets.  
 
One way in which companies have impacted the nature of work negatively is by 
using their workforce to absorb the risk the company would normally face. Therefore, 
the ‘risks of fluctuating demand are no longer absorbed by companies; they are 
displaced on their workforces’.
367
 This is usually done through casualization and 
externalisation, thus resulting in the flexibilisation of labour. Companies regulate the 
flexibilisation of labour through the contracts they conclude with their workers as well 
as through the commercial contracts they concluded with entities that supply them with 
labour such as sub-contractors or a TES. Although companies conclude these contracts 
with individuals these contracts have a secondary effect as they not only affect the 
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parties directly involved, but they also impact the workforce in general. Therefore the 
contracts companies enter into end up affecting workers even though there might not be 
privity of contract between the company and the workforce. These inequities within the 
labour market are not a new phenomenon per se. States have been regulating these 
imbalances through various forms of market regulation for a while now. However, what 
has changed is the increase in the flexibilisation of labour and the decrease in the ability 
of the regulatory systems set up to cope with the changes in the nature of employment. 
Thus, atypical workers are increasingly exposed to the negative and inequitable effects 
of the market. In light of this it has now become necessary for companies to assume 
responsibility for these negative effects and intervene.  
 
When it comes to increasing the accountability of c mpanies within the labour 
market place corporate governance might provide a suitable solution. Corporate 
governance has undergone some significant changes from the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Corporate governance is now  
 
‘concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals, with the result 
that corporate governance should be seen as the system by which organisations are or 





Stakeholders are defined widely and include ‘employees and others potentially 
qualifying as stakeholders in the business such as suppliers, lenders, customers and 
perhaps society at large’.
369
 Therefore directors must run the company in the interests of 
shareholders as well as stakeholders. This position departs from the common law which 
states that directors must act in the interests of the company where the company is 
defined as the shareholders of the company.
370
 In South Africa the King Code of 
Governance for South Africa (King III) has made it clear that directors now owe their 
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duties to the company which is made up of both shareholders and stakeholders. King III 
is a code of good practice and thus does not change the common law position regarding 
the duty of directors; however it is a code advocating good governance, an aspect that is 
becoming increasingly important in business.  
 
King III also introduces the idea of corporate citizenship. The company is viewed 
as being responsible for financial social and environmental issues. Thus when 
companies compile their financial report they must include an ‘integrated report’ which 
focuses on the company’s financial performance as well as its impact on the community 
within which it operates and the environment.
371
 This is known as triple bottom line 
reporting.
372
 The report must include an account of the company’s ‘positive and negative 
impact’ of the company’s operations as well as ‘plans to improve the positives and 
eradicate or ameliorate the negatives in the financial year ahead...’.
373
 The ‘community’ 
can include employees as well as the ‘local community in which the company carries on 
its business’.
374
 This idea of corporate citizenship ultimately embraces the notion that 





Integrated reporting can act as a flexible regulatory device for atypical 
employment. The term ‘community’ is broad enough to encompass all forms of 
employment whether typical or atypical. First, it can encompass those workers in 
standard employment relationships as well as atypical workers in casualised forms of 
employment such as fixed term contracts and seasonal migrants. Therefore, when the 
company compiles its integrated report it must include the positive and negative impact 
it has had on this group of workers. If the manner in which the company is run has had a 
negative impact on these workers then the company is obligated to create a plan that 
‘eradicates or ameliorates’ these negative outcomes. In order for the company to be 
aware of the impact it has had on its workforce as well as create plans for improvement 
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it must communicate with its workforce. The method of communication used will most 
likely make use of some form of collective voice regulation within the workplace such 
as a joint consultative forum. This therefore gives workers in standard employment 
relationships as well as atypical workers within the workplace a voice that represents 
their needs and can adapt to the changes in workforce composition within the workplace. 
 
Second, the notion of community is also broad enough to encompass those 
workers who are not in an employment relationship with the company, but are 
nevertheless affected by the manner in which the company conducts its business. This 
notion of community would thus include workers who are employed by subcontractors 
who are hired by the company and those workers provided by a TES. For instance, a 
company that operates within the building sector might choose to minimise its labour 
costs by outsourcing some of its labour requirements to LOSCs. However if the LOSCs 
the company utilises undercut wages and do not comply with collective agreements 
setting minimum wages within the sector then the manner in which the company 
conducts its business will have a negative impact on the community. This means that the 
company will be obligated to remedy the situation. This can be done by ensuring that the 
company does not do business with those sub-contractors that do not comply with the 
minimum wages set by collective agreements. This has the effect of offering workers in 
atypical employment some form of protection as well as supporting the centralised 
collective bargaining scheme established in the 1995 LRA, thereby ensuring that 
collective voice within the sector grows stronger. 
 
3.2.2. Community unionism 
Industrial trade unions developed within the context of the standard employment 
relationship as a result they are designed to function within the context of a standard 
employment relationship. Within this context the collective voice of employees is used 
to bargain with the employer. The employees’ collective voice is represented by 
industrial unions which tend to represent specific categories of people within a specific 
industry. Industrial unions therefore best cater to the traditional notions of work and 












those workers that do not find themselves employed in a standard employment 
relationship. In atypical employment workers are constantly moving from workplace to 
workplace and from one employer to the next. Consequently industrial unions have 
struggled to recruit, organise and represent atypical workers. A new form of 
organisational structure might assist unions reach and recruit hard to access workers. 
 
The collective voice does not need to consist solely of employees. It can be more 
inclusive. For instance, South African unions could use ‘reciprocal community 
unionism’ as a type of collective voice.
376
 Reciprocal community unionism is based on 
the notion that unions can create relationships with community groups and together the 
two entities can help each other ‘improve local life as well as [foster] trade union 
growth’.
377
 Community organisations can assist unions in 
 
‘[mobilising] pressure, and perhaps [generating] resources, which can counteract the 




This form of organisation thus promotes the use of a collective voice representative of 
all the relevant parties. Linking unions with communities offers two primary advantages. 
First, it shifts the identity of the union from the traditional employment relationship and 
redirects it to a more multi-party approach. This allows for both flexiblility and 
representation within the labour market place. This is particularly useful in the case of an 
employment relationship based on a TES where there is a “nominal” employer and a 
“real” employer. A multi-party approach will ensure that both employers are involved in 
negotiations. Unions that work together with community organisations are also useful 
within the informal sector. The informal sector has a number of parties connected either 
through commercial contracts, employment contracts or through law, as is the case with 
local government. Partnering with community organisations allows these various parties 
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to be included in bargaining thus ensuring that all the relevant parties have an 
opportunity to express their voice. This ensures that no one is excluded from the 
bargaining process thus guaranteeing that workers in standard employment relationships 
as well as atypical employment are included.  
 
Second, this approach acknowledges that the pressures of globalisation have 
altered the nature of the workplace. It is no longer the place where workers primarily 
congregate nor is it the place where workers build string relationships and identities.
379
 
For instance, atypical workers within the retail sector move from one workplace to the 
other and from one employer to the next depending on the availability of employment. 
Therefore it is no longer the case that identities and social units that used to form at a 
workplace are still being formed in the context of atypical employment.
380
 Identities can, 
however still be formed within a community.
381
 There are a number of aspects that can 
be used to identify a community such as geographical location, gender and age. 
Connecting a union within a community captures a broader category of workers than an 
industrial union focused on a specific skill within a specific industry could 
accommodate. This makes it easier for unions to reach those workers that are hard to 
access like casual workers who tend to move from one employer to another. It also 
ensures flexibility within the union. Including such a broad category of workers ensures 
that the community based union is able to accommodate and adapt to any changes that 
might occur within the labour market. This ensures a stronger and more representative 
voice which is able to effect change. 
 
The idea of linking community organisations with unions is not new. It was 
present during the 1970s and 1980s. During this period South Africans where living 
under a repressive government and thus they were unhappy with the political and 
economic situation. Africans who lived in the townships formed community 
organisations aimed at addressing political and socio-economic issues in the townships. 
Unions were involved in this. For instance in ‘in 1979 many of the township based 
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community organisations began organising working class constituencies and succeeded 
in attracting workers in increasing numbers’.
382
 However, the relationship between 
community organisations and unions became strained over time as they failed to 
properly coordinate mass action boycotts in support of one another.
383
 If unions and 
community organisations are able to work together successfully, the reciprocal 
relationship between the two entities could assist unions access those workers that are 
difficult to organise and grow their membership.  
  
3.2.3. Limitations: 
The amended definition of ‘workplace’ allows unions to reach a those atypical workers 
that are difficult to reach, however it has its shortcomings. The amended definition 
would mainly assist those workers who are employed by sub-contractors or a TES. The 
amended definition relates primarily to location thus assisting those workers who find 
themselves working in one location for a significant period of time despite being 
employed by another employer. It does not fully address those workers who are at one 
location for a shorter period of time like casual workers for instance, who tend to be 
more mobile. 
 
Corporate governance provides a solution to the problems experienced by the 
collective bargaining mechanisms established by the 1995 LRA. However, it is not a 
panacea. It too has its limitations. The first is that compliance with King III is voluntary, 
therefore, there is no statutory duty compelling companies to apply it. Second, it is a 
“top-down” solution as it relies on companies to create solutions. Therefore, the 
workforce is at the mercy of the company as compliance and enforcement of any plans 
are based on the general goodwill of the company. In addition, this “top-down” approach 
might affect the quality of the workers’ voice as any consultations or negotiations that 
take place again occur at the goodwill of the company. If corporate governance is to 
assist collective bargaining in a meaningful way it must be monitored by strong unions. 
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 Uniting unions and community organisation tries to effect change by involving 
more bargaining parties than the two traditional bargaining agents. The various 
bargaining parties and the inclusive bargaining agenda could result in negotiations 
becoming extremely time consuming as parties try to accommodate all the different 
agendas and interests. The idea behind linking unions and community organisations is 
mutual support. This includes supporting each other when striking or protesting. In 
South Africa persons who embark on industrial action and are not employees might lack 
the protection afforded to striking workers by the 1995 LRA; however it is possible to 
use section 77 of the 1995 LRA
384
 to protect some atypical workers. This section permits 
workers to take part in protest action which ‘promotes or defends the socio-economic 
interests of workers’.
385
 Ultimately, the success or failure of community based unions as 
a concept is dependent on the levels of trust that exists between union members and the 
community. If there is a lack of trust individualism rather than collectivism will be 
promoted within the thus limiting the ability of the collective voice to effect change. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Labour market regulation is directed towards intervening in and countering the negative 
effects of the market. When South Africa gained democracy in 1994 it aimed to address 
the inequalities in the labour market through the use of the two most common forms of 
labour market regulation, statutory and collective voice regulation. The 1995 LRA 
established the mechanism for collective voice regulation. The Act was, however drafted 
within the context of the standard employment relationship and thus it was designed to 
cater to the standard employment relationship. The changes introduced by globalisation 
to the economy led to changes in the nature of work and the growth of atypical workers. 
The system of collective voice regulation established by the 1995 LRA is struggling to 
recruit, organise, retain and represent these workers.  
 
 If the collective bargaining mechanisms established by the 1995 LRA are to de 
facto apply to atypical workers some changes need to be made. First, the definition of 
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‘workplace’ would have to be amended in such a way as to shift from the paradigm of 
standard employment relationship to that which includes standard and non-standard 
relationships. This would make it easier for unions to recruit, organise and retain 
atypical workers. 
 
King III which creates a corporate governance code of good practice for 
companies states that companies must report on three aspects in their financial reports; 
finances, the and the company’s impact on the community and the environment. This 
report must include how the company has impacted the community within which it is 
operating as well as plans for remedying any negative impacts that might have resulted 
as a consequence of the way in which the company conducts its business. The notion of 
community is a broad enough to include workers in standard and non-standard 
employment relationships which means that the duty created by King III to report on the 
company’s effect on the community can be used to improve the working conditions of 
both standard and atypical workers.  
 
 Furthermore, collaboration between community organisations and unions can be 
used to organise workers and effect change within the labour market place. The two 
entities could focus on recruiting and retaining people within a community rather than 
workers in a traditional employment relationship. This aids those atypical workers that 
have to negotiate with a number of parties. It also makes recruitment easier as union 
activity can be located within the community rather than the workplace. 
 
 Although the abovementioned solutions have their own limitations they do assist 
the collective bargaining mechanism and introduce a flexible form of voice regulation 
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